US-Iran ceasefire continues through...?

According to the latest prediction market data for the query “US-Iran ceasefire continues through...?”, traders have formed a strong consensus.

Currently, September 20 is dominating the market with an overwhelming 95.5% chance of winning. September 25 follows in second place at 82.5%, while September 30 sits in third with 74.5%. The betting volume for this specific market has already reached $92.6K, reflecting intense industry interest.

To better assess where each potential outcome stands, the market can be segmented into three distinct trading tiers based on implied probability and contract pricing:

🥇 Tier 1: The Dominant Leader

• September 20 (95.5%): Currently commanding the highest probability, September 20 is heavily favored by the order book. Traders looking to back this outcome face a “Buy Yes” contract price of 96¢, signaling a high degree of market conviction. This contract alone has generated $20.1K in volume.

🥈 Tier 2: The Primary Challengers

• September 25 (82.5%): Positioned as the most viable alternative, September 25 maintains a 82.5% chance of resolving true. Its “Buy Yes” shares currently trade at 83¢.
• September 30 (74.5%): Sitting in third place with a 74.5% probability, the market shows measured skepticism toward September 30, treating it as an outside wildcard unless momentum shifts.

🥉 Tier 3: The Long-Tail Options (Combining for ~0%)

Beyond the top three choices, a wide field of macro variables and long-shot outcomes are being tracked. While their individual probabilities hover low, they represent crucial hedges for speculative traders:

• Alternative Options: This includes October 31 (55.5%).
• Speculative Volume: Despite low statistical likelihood, certain long-tail contracts like October 31 are still attracting notable interest.

This market will resolve to “No” if the United States takes a qualifying military action against Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time. Otherwise this market will resolve to “Yes.”

A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by the United States, that directly impacts Iran. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles.

The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action:

Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact;

Surface-to-air missile strikes;

Small-arms fire;

Ground incursions;

Cyber operations;

Naval gunfire and artillery fire;

Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems);

Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes;

Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed.

Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred.

“Iran” refers to the terrestrial territory of Iran, including its internal waters. Iran’s maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of Iran as of market creation will qualify.

The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (Iran Standard Time) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. At the end of the third calendar day, if conflicting reports remain, the incident will be adjudicated based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information.

The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of the United States and Iran and a consensus of credible reporting.

While human consensus and speculative volume shape the broader prediction market, our quantitative algorithms offer a data-driven counter-perspective. By analyzing fundamental signals, underlying trends and historical distributions, our AI Valuation model calculates an independent “Fair Value” probability for each outcome.

Comparing this Fair Value against the current Trade Value uncovers major disparities — known as the Expected Value (EV) Gap. Contracts with a positive EV Gap represent statistically underpriced outcomes, whereas a negative EV Gap flags a potential market overreaction.

Top AI Alpha & Mispriced Arbitrage Opportunities

Based on the latest data model run, several key contracts stand out with significant deviations:

• The Most Overvalued Outcome September 20 currently trades at 95.5%, but our AI places its Fair Value at just 86.9%. This creates a large negative EV Gap of -8.6%, suggesting the crowd may be overhyping this outcome and driving the premium too high.
• The Best Value Play (Highest EV) Our model identifies October 31 as the premium value opportunity on the board. While the market only assigns it a 55.5% trading probability, our AI’s Fair Value assessment sits at 61.1% — yielding an impressive +5.6% EV Gap.
• Under-the-Radar Dark Horses Other notable discrepancies include September 25 (EV Gap: +5.2%) and September 30 (EV Gap: +2.6%). These long-tail opportunities are heavily discounted by the live order books despite stronger statistical backing from our predictive model.