Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?

$443.4K Vol
2026年12月31日
Active
機率趨勢
December 31 25.5%
October 31 15.0%
June 30 0.1%
May 31 0.1%

核心摘要

根據「Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?」的最新預測市場資料,交易者已形成強烈共識。

目前,December 31 以壓倒性的 24.5% 獲勝機率主導市場;October 31 以 21.5% 位居第二,June 30 以 3.6% 排名第三。該市場的下注量已達 $443.4K,反映出市場的高度關注。

競爭梯隊拆解

為了更好地評估各潛在結果的位置,可依據隱含機率與合約定價將市場劃分為三個明顯的交易梯隊:

🥇 第一梯隊:絕對領跑者

  • December 31 (24.5%):December 31 目前擁有最高機率,深受訂單簿青睞。看好該結果的交易者面對的「Buy Yes」合約價為 25¢,顯示出市場的高度確信。僅該合約就已產生 $135.8K 的成交量。

🥈 第二梯隊:主要挑戰者

  • October 31 (21.5%):作為最可行的替代選項,October 31 保持著 21.5% 的成真機率,其「Buy Yes」份額目前成交價為 22¢。
  • June 30 (3.6%):以 3.6% 的機率位列第三,市場對 June 30 持謹慎懷疑態度,除非勢頭轉變,否則視其為外圍黑馬。

完整訂單簿與定價面板

下表列出了該預測池中所有結果的合約價格、機率與市場深度的完整拆解:

排名預測結果獲勝機率成交量買入 Yes(成本)買入 No(成本)
1December 3124.5%$135.8K25¢76¢
2October 3121.5%$101.8K22¢79¢
3June 303.5%$186.0K96¢

裁決規則

This market will resolve to "Yes" if a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine goes into effect by 11:59 PM Eastern European Time (EET) on the specified date and remains continuously in effect for at least 10 calendar days. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

A ceasefire refers to any mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries, and which constitutes a general suspension of direct kinetic military engagement across the primary theater of the overall conflict. A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause (including holiday ceasefires) will count provided they otherwise qualify under this market’s rules.

Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.

Any calendar day (EET) during which the ceasefire is in effect (including the first day of the ceasefire) will count towards the 10-day total. The required 10 day period will end at 11:59 PM EET on the 10th day (inclusive). If a qualifying ceasefire goes into effect prior to this market’s end date, this market will remain open until the ceasefire is no longer in effect, or until the 10 calendar days have been reached.

A ceasefire is considered no longer in effect when a consensus of credible reporting indicates the general suspension of hostilities has substantively ended across the primary theater. Temporary or technical lapses or expiration of a formal ceasefire term, isolated incidents, localized violations, or accusations alone will not invalidate the ceasefire provided the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater continues. Where official government statements conflict with a consensus of credible field reporting, the reporting will take precedence over the government statements.

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible sources.

Examples of qualifying Ceasefires:

April 8, 2026 US–Iran ceasefire: The United States and Iran publicly announced and implemented a mutually agreed ceasefire framework intended to broadly halt direct military hostilities between the two countries. Despite subsequent maritime confrontations, alleged violations, isolated retaliatory strikes, and disputes regarding compliance, the broader ceasefire framework continued to function and widescale fighting across the primary theater did not resume.

November 27, 2024 Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire: Israel and Hezbollah implemented a broadly operative ceasefire framework brokered through international mediators that substantially reduced hostilities across southern Lebanon and northern Israel, including the effective halt of Israel’s major ground offensive into Lebanon and a significant reduction in Hezbollah rocket fire. Although the ceasefire was not formally announced through a single joint declaration by both parties and public statements differed in framing and characterization, a consensus of credible reporting confirmed the arrangement had been mutually agreed and implemented in practice. Despite continued isolated strikes, alleged violations, and disputes regarding compliance, credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefire as remaining operational and widescale fighting across the primary theater of the conflict did not resume.

Examples of non qualifying Ceasefires:

November 24, 2023 Israel–Hamas humanitarian pause: Although it was a mutually agreed and publicly announced broad suspension of hostilities across Gaza, the ceasefire framework remained in effect for only approximately 7 days before wide-scale fighting resumed, failing the required 10-calendar-day duration requirement. Ceasefire violations prior to November 30, would not have invalidated the ceasefire.

July 22, 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative: Although Russia and Ukraine entered into internationally brokered agreements governing grain exports and reducing risks to commercial shipping in the Black Sea, the arrangement did not constitute a general suspension of direct military engagement across the primary theater of the war. Hostilities continued across Ukraine throughout the duration of the agreement and the arrangement applied only to specific categories of activity and geographic areas.

May 2023 Sudan ceasefires (SAF–RSF): Although the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) publicly agreed to multiple internationally brokered ceasefires, a consensus of credible reporting indicated that the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater never substantively took effect and large-scale fighting broadly continued throughout the ceasefire periods. While some temporary reductions in violence and localized humanitarian access reportedly occurred in certain areas, artillery fire, airstrikes, urban combat, troop movements, and offensive operations continued across major parts of Sudan almost immediately after implementation. Credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefires as having failed or collapsed in practice despite technically remaining in force on paper.

AI 估值分析:發現市場錯誤定價與 EV 差

人群共識與投機成交塑造了更宏觀的預測市場,而我們的量化演算法提供了資料驅動的反向視角。透過分析基本面訊號、底層趨勢與歷史分布,我們的 AI 估值模型為每個結果獨立測算出一個「公允價值」機率。

將該公允價值與當前交易價值對比,可揭示出重大背離——即期望值(EV)差。正 EV 差代表統計上被低估的結果,而負 EV 差則提示市場可能存在反應過度。

頂級 AI Alpha 與錯誤定價套利機會

根據最新一輪資料模型測算,以下幾個關鍵合約存在顯著偏離:

  • 最佳價值標的(最高 EV):我們的模型將 June 30 識別為盤面上最具價值的機會。市場僅給予其 3.6% 的交易機率,而我們 AI 的公允價值評估為 47.2%——形成可觀的 +43.7% EV 差。
  • 被忽視的黑馬:其他值得注意的偏離包括 October 31(EV 差:+30.1%)。儘管我們的預測模型給予更強的統計支撐,這些長尾機會仍被即時訂單簿大幅低估。
MarketTrade ValueFair ValueEV Gap
December 3124.5%47.4%+22.9%
October 3121.5%51.6%+30.1%
June 30Best EV3.5%47.2%+43.6%

交易動態

以下是該事件的交易動態。

Jun 30, 2026

  • 08:00 AM
    PPppooe
    $4.20

    Sold 5 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 07:56 AM
    SUsuigeyi
    $6.02

    Sold 7.17 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 07:47 AM
    EEeeirl
    $6.10

    Sold 7.26 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 07:39 AM
    JOjonathanfrake11
    $7.12

    Bought 8.279064 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.86

  • 07:39 AM
    UUuuusdl
    $6.10

    Sold 7.26 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 07:35 AM
    XIxingshare
    $6.25

    Sold 7.44 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 07:03 AM
    SOsopm
    $6.25

    Sold 7.44 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 06:55 AM
    SOsoosooq
    $6.25

    Sold 7.44 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 06:51 AM
    2626fer
    $6.10

    Sold 7.26 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 06:47 AM
    QIqifeili
    $6.25

    Sold 7.44 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 04:48 AM
    CIciatc
    $6.10

    Sold 7.26 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

  • 04:46 AM
    YIyiya
    $6.25

    Sold 7.44 No for Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by October 31, 2026? at 0.84

正在押注該事件的鯨魚錢包

KR1
KrackenSruster
Event PnL
+$2,415.21
Volume
$50,317.26
Positions
NoNoNo
FE2
Ferwhere
Event PnL
-$1,582.02
Volume
$33,797.26
Positions
Yes
NI3
Nikitka
Event PnL
-$1,541.11
Volume
$24,354.56
Positions
YesYes
NO4
noreasapa
Event PnL
+$37.56
Volume
$23,534.62
Positions
No
AI5
AiBird
Event PnL
-$297.07
Volume
$22,984.78
Positions
YesYes
AV6
avel-mink
Event PnL
-$110.00
Volume
$20,000.00
Positions
Yes
WC7
WCBT
Event PnL
-$1,197.83
Volume
$19,590.24
Positions
Yes
JO8
JoeBlack01
Event PnL
+$914.18
Volume
$18,870.79
Positions
NoNoNo

常見問題

目前市場對「Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?」的共識是什麼?

截至最新更新,December 31 以 24.5% 的獲勝機率領跑,其次是 October 31(21.5%),以及 June 30(3.6%)。該市場總成交量已達 $443.4K,顯示出充足的流動性與高交易參與度。

AI 公允價值與即時市場交易價值有何不同?

即時市場交易價值反映的是公眾情緒、訂單簿動能與投機資金。我們的 AI 公允價值則由量化模型獨立計算,剔除情緒炒作、專注底層數據。兩者出現顯著背離時即形成 EV 差,提示市場對某個結果可能存在錯誤定價。

目前哪個結果的期望值(EV)最高?

最新一輪測算顯示,June 30 是最顯著的錯誤定價。市場對其隱含機率僅給到 3.6%,而我們的 AI 測算其公允價值為 47.2%——形成 +43.7% 的期望值差,是該市場中最具價值的標的。

長尾資料中是否藏有高價值的黑馬選項?

當然有。除了頭部結果之外,我們的模型在排名靠後的選項中發現了被低估的潛力。October 31 擁有 +30.1% 的正 EV 差。儘管量化層面更有支撐,這些合約仍被即時訂單簿低估。

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