Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?

根据「Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?」的最新预测市场数据，交易者已形成强烈共识。

目前，December 31 以压倒性的 24.5% 获胜概率主导市场；October 31 以 21.5% 位居第二，June 30 以 3.6% 排名第三。该市场的下注量已达 $443.4K，反映出市场的高度关注。

为了更好地评估各潜在结果的位置，可依据隐含概率与合约定价将市场划分为三个明显的交易梯队：

🥇 第一梯队：绝对领跑者

• December 31 (24.5%)：December 31 目前拥有最高概率，深受订单簿青睐。看好该结果的交易者面对的「Buy Yes」合约价为 25¢，显示出市场的高度确信。仅该合约就已产生 $135.8K 的成交量。

🥈 第二梯队：主要挑战者

• October 31 (21.5%)：作为最可行的替代选项，October 31 保持着 21.5% 的成真概率，其「Buy Yes」份额目前成交价为 22¢。
• June 30 (3.6%)：以 3.6% 的概率位列第三，市场对 June 30 持谨慎怀疑态度，除非势头转变，否则视其为外围黑马。

This market will resolve to "Yes" if a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine goes into effect by 11:59 PM Eastern European Time (EET) on the specified date and remains continuously in effect for at least 10 calendar days. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

A ceasefire refers to any mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries, and which constitutes a general suspension of direct kinetic military engagement across the primary theater of the overall conflict. A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause (including holiday ceasefires) will count provided they otherwise qualify under this market’s rules.

Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.

Any calendar day (EET) during which the ceasefire is in effect (including the first day of the ceasefire) will count towards the 10-day total. The required 10 day period will end at 11:59 PM EET on the 10th day (inclusive). If a qualifying ceasefire goes into effect prior to this market’s end date, this market will remain open until the ceasefire is no longer in effect, or until the 10 calendar days have been reached.

A ceasefire is considered no longer in effect when a consensus of credible reporting indicates the general suspension of hostilities has substantively ended across the primary theater. Temporary or technical lapses or expiration of a formal ceasefire term, isolated incidents, localized violations, or accusations alone will not invalidate the ceasefire provided the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater continues. Where official government statements conflict with a consensus of credible field reporting, the reporting will take precedence over the government statements.

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible sources.

Examples of qualifying Ceasefires:

April 8, 2026 US–Iran ceasefire: The United States and Iran publicly announced and implemented a mutually agreed ceasefire framework intended to broadly halt direct military hostilities between the two countries. Despite subsequent maritime confrontations, alleged violations, isolated retaliatory strikes, and disputes regarding compliance, the broader ceasefire framework continued to function and widescale fighting across the primary theater did not resume.

November 27, 2024 Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire: Israel and Hezbollah implemented a broadly operative ceasefire framework brokered through international mediators that substantially reduced hostilities across southern Lebanon and northern Israel, including the effective halt of Israel’s major ground offensive into Lebanon and a significant reduction in Hezbollah rocket fire. Although the ceasefire was not formally announced through a single joint declaration by both parties and public statements differed in framing and characterization, a consensus of credible reporting confirmed the arrangement had been mutually agreed and implemented in practice. Despite continued isolated strikes, alleged violations, and disputes regarding compliance, credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefire as remaining operational and widescale fighting across the primary theater of the conflict did not resume.

Examples of non qualifying Ceasefires:

November 24, 2023 Israel–Hamas humanitarian pause: Although it was a mutually agreed and publicly announced broad suspension of hostilities across Gaza, the ceasefire framework remained in effect for only approximately 7 days before wide-scale fighting resumed, failing the required 10-calendar-day duration requirement. Ceasefire violations prior to November 30, would not have invalidated the ceasefire.

July 22, 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative: Although Russia and Ukraine entered into internationally brokered agreements governing grain exports and reducing risks to commercial shipping in the Black Sea, the arrangement did not constitute a general suspension of direct military engagement across the primary theater of the war. Hostilities continued across Ukraine throughout the duration of the agreement and the arrangement applied only to specific categories of activity and geographic areas.

May 2023 Sudan ceasefires (SAF–RSF): Although the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) publicly agreed to multiple internationally brokered ceasefires, a consensus of credible reporting indicated that the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater never substantively took effect and large-scale fighting broadly continued throughout the ceasefire periods. While some temporary reductions in violence and localized humanitarian access reportedly occurred in certain areas, artillery fire, airstrikes, urban combat, troop movements, and offensive operations continued across major parts of Sudan almost immediately after implementation. Credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefires as having failed or collapsed in practice despite technically remaining in force on paper.

人群共识与投机成交塑造了更宏观的预测市场，而我们的量化算法提供了数据驱动的反向视角。通过分析基本面信号、底层趋势与历史分布，我们的 AI 估值模型为每个结果独立测算出一个「公允价值」概率。

将该公允价值与当前交易价值对比，可揭示出重大背离——即期望值（EV）差。正 EV 差代表统计上被低估的结果，而负 EV 差则提示市场可能存在反应过度。

顶级 AI Alpha 与错误定价套利机会

根据最新一轮数据模型测算，以下几个关键合约存在显著偏离：

• 最佳价值标的（最高 EV）：我们的模型将 June 30 识别为盘面上最具价值的机会。市场仅给予其 3.6% 的交易概率，而我们 AI 的公允价值评估为 47.2%——形成可观的 +43.7% EV 差。
• 被忽视的黑马：其他值得注意的偏离包括 October 31（EV 差：+30.1%）。尽管我们的预测模型给予更强的统计支撑，这些长尾机会仍被实时订单簿大幅低估。