US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…?

「US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…?」に関する最新の予測市場データによると、トレーダーの間で強いコンセンサスが形成されています。

現在、August 31 が 25.5% という圧倒的な勝率で市場を支配しています。August 18 が 22% で2番手、August 13 が 12.5% で3番手。この市場の賭け金はすでに $2.4M に達し、高い関心を示しています。

各結果の位置をより的確に評価するため、市場はインプライド確率と契約価格に基づいて3つの取引ティアに分けられます：

🥇 ティア1：圧倒的なリーダー

• August 31 (25.5%)：最も高い確率を持つ August 31 は板から厚く支持されています。この結果に賭けるトレーダーは 26¢ の「Buy Yes」契約価格に直面し、市場の強い確信を示しています。 この契約だけで $1.5M の出来高を生んでいます。

🥈 ティア2：主要な対抗馬

• August 18 (22%)：最も有力な対抗馬として、August 18 は 22% の的中確率を維持しています。「Buy Yes」株は現在 22¢ で取引されています。
• August 13 (12.5%)：12.5% の確率で3番手につけ、市場は August 13 に慎重な懐疑を示し、勢いが変わらない限り外部のワイルドカードと見なしています。

🥉 ティア3：ロングテール選択肢（合計約 40%）

トップ3以外にも、多くのマクロ変数と大穴の結果が追跡されています。個々の確率は低いものの、投機トレーダーにとって重要なヘッジとなります：

• 代替選択肢：July 31 (4.5%)、June 30 (0.3%) などが含まれます。
• 投機的出来高：統計的な可能性は低いものの、July 31 のようなロングテール契約は依然として相応の関心を集めています。

On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics.

This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”

Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures.

If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including:

(i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument;

(ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries;

(iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or

(iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument.

A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must:

(i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting;

(ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify.

The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify:

(i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument;

(ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation;

(iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks.

A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify.

Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies.

An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied.

Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.

人間のコンセンサスと投機的出来高がより広い予測市場を形作る一方で、当社の定量アルゴリズムはデータ駆動の対抗的視点を提供します。ファンダメンタルなシグナル、基調トレンド、過去の分布を分析し、AI バリュエーションモデルは各結果に独立した「フェアバリュー」確率を算出します。

このフェアバリューを現在の取引価値と比較すると、大きな乖離——すなわち期待値（EV）ギャップ——が明らかになります。プラスの EV ギャップは統計的に割安な結果を、マイナスの EV ギャップは市場の過剰反応の可能性を示します。

トップ AI アルファ＆ミスプライス裁定機会

最新のデータモデル実行に基づき、いくつかの主要な契約が顕著な乖離を示しています：

• ベストバリュー（最高 EV）：当社のモデルは July 31 を盤面で最も妙味のある機会と特定しました。市場は 4.5% の取引確率しか与えていませんが、AI のフェアバリュー評価は 20.7% で、+16.2% という印象的な EV ギャップを生んでいます。
• 見落とされたダークホース：その他の顕著な乖離には August 18（EV ギャップ：+10.7%）、June 30（EV ギャップ：+1.8%） が含まれます。これらのロングテール機会は、予測モデルの強い統計的裏付けにもかかわらず、板で大幅に割安に放置されています。