US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…?

Según los datos más recientes del mercado de predicción para la consulta “US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…?”, los operadores han formado un fuerte consenso.

Actualmente, August 31 domina el mercado con una abrumadora probabilidad de victoria del 25,5%. August 18 le sigue en segundo lugar con 22%, mientras que August 13 se sitúa tercero con 12,5%. El volumen de apuestas de este mercado ya alcanza $2,4M, lo que refleja un enorme interés.

Para evaluar mejor la posición de cada resultado posible, el mercado puede segmentarse en tres niveles de negociación según la probabilidad implícita y el precio de los contratos:

🥇 Nivel 1: El líder dominante

• August 31 (25,5%): Con la probabilidad más alta, August 31 cuenta con un fuerte respaldo del libro de órdenes. Quienes quieran apostar por este resultado se enfrentan a un precio de contrato “Buy Yes” de 26¢, señal de una gran convicción del mercado. Solo este contrato ha generado $1.5M de volumen.

🥈 Nivel 2: Los principales aspirantes

• August 18 (22%): Como la alternativa más viable, August 18 mantiene una probabilidad del 22% de resolverse a favor. Sus acciones “Buy Yes” cotizan actualmente a 22¢.
• August 13 (12,5%): En tercer lugar con una probabilidad del 12,5%, el mercado muestra un escepticismo prudente hacia August 13, tratándolo como un comodín externo salvo que cambie el impulso.

🥉 Nivel 3: Las opciones de cola larga (suman ~40%)

Más allá de las tres primeras opciones, se sigue un amplio campo de variables macro y resultados poco probables. Aunque sus probabilidades individuales son bajas, son coberturas clave para los operadores especulativos:

• Opciones alternativas: Esto incluye July 31 (4,5%) y June 30 (0,3%).
• Volumen especulativo: A pesar de su baja probabilidad estadística, ciertos contratos de cola larga como July 31 siguen atrayendo un interés notable.

On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics.

This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”

Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures.

If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including:

(i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument;

(ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries;

(iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or

(iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument.

A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must:

(i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting;

(ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify.

The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify:

(i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument;

(ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation;

(iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks.

A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify.

Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies.

An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied.

Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.

Aunque el consenso humano y el volumen especulativo dan forma al mercado de predicción, nuestros algoritmos cuantitativos ofrecen una contraperspectiva basada en datos. Al analizar señales fundamentales, tendencias subyacentes y distribuciones históricas, nuestro modelo de Valoración por IA calcula una probabilidad de “Valor Justo” independiente para cada resultado.

Comparar este Valor Justo con el Valor de Mercado actual revela grandes discrepancias, conocidas como la Brecha de Valor Esperado (EV). Los contratos con una Brecha de EV positiva representan resultados infravalorados estadísticamente, mientras que una Brecha de EV negativa señala una posible sobrerreacción del mercado.

Principales Oportunidades de Alpha de IA y Arbitraje

Según la última ejecución del modelo de datos, varios contratos clave destacan con desviaciones significativas:

• La mejor jugada de valor (mayor EV): Nuestro modelo identifica a July 31 como la mejor oportunidad de valor del tablero. Mientras el mercado solo le asigna una probabilidad del 4,5%, la evaluación de Valor Justo de nuestra IA se sitúa en 20,7%, generando una notable Brecha de EV de +16,2%.
• Caballos ganadores poco visibles: Otras discrepancias notables incluyen August 18 (Brecha de EV: +10,7%) y June 30 (Brecha de EV: +1,8%). Estas oportunidades de cola larga están muy infravaloradas por los libros de órdenes pese a un mayor respaldo estadístico de nuestro modelo.