Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?

Según los datos más recientes del mercado de predicción para la consulta “Russia x Ukraine Ceasefire by...?”, los operadores han formado un fuerte consenso.

Actualmente, December 31 domina el mercado con una abrumadora probabilidad de victoria del 24,5%. October 31 le sigue en segundo lugar con 21,5%, mientras que June 30 se sitúa tercero con 3,6%. El volumen de apuestas de este mercado ya alcanza $443,4K, lo que refleja un enorme interés.

Para evaluar mejor la posición de cada resultado posible, el mercado puede segmentarse en tres niveles de negociación según la probabilidad implícita y el precio de los contratos:

🥇 Nivel 1: El líder dominante

• December 31 (24,5%): Con la probabilidad más alta, December 31 cuenta con un fuerte respaldo del libro de órdenes. Quienes quieran apostar por este resultado se enfrentan a un precio de contrato “Buy Yes” de 25¢, señal de una gran convicción del mercado. Solo este contrato ha generado $135.8K de volumen.

🥈 Nivel 2: Los principales aspirantes

• October 31 (21,5%): Como la alternativa más viable, October 31 mantiene una probabilidad del 21,5% de resolverse a favor. Sus acciones “Buy Yes” cotizan actualmente a 22¢.
• June 30 (3,6%): En tercer lugar con una probabilidad del 3,6%, el mercado muestra un escepticismo prudente hacia June 30, tratándolo como un comodín externo salvo que cambie el impulso.

This market will resolve to "Yes" if a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine goes into effect by 11:59 PM Eastern European Time (EET) on the specified date and remains continuously in effect for at least 10 calendar days. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".

A ceasefire refers to any mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries, and which constitutes a general suspension of direct kinetic military engagement across the primary theater of the overall conflict. A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause (including holiday ceasefires) will count provided they otherwise qualify under this market’s rules.

Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.

Any calendar day (EET) during which the ceasefire is in effect (including the first day of the ceasefire) will count towards the 10-day total. The required 10 day period will end at 11:59 PM EET on the 10th day (inclusive). If a qualifying ceasefire goes into effect prior to this market’s end date, this market will remain open until the ceasefire is no longer in effect, or until the 10 calendar days have been reached.

A ceasefire is considered no longer in effect when a consensus of credible reporting indicates the general suspension of hostilities has substantively ended across the primary theater. Temporary or technical lapses or expiration of a formal ceasefire term, isolated incidents, localized violations, or accusations alone will not invalidate the ceasefire provided the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater continues. Where official government statements conflict with a consensus of credible field reporting, the reporting will take precedence over the government statements.

The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible sources.

Examples of qualifying Ceasefires:

April 8, 2026 US–Iran ceasefire: The United States and Iran publicly announced and implemented a mutually agreed ceasefire framework intended to broadly halt direct military hostilities between the two countries. Despite subsequent maritime confrontations, alleged violations, isolated retaliatory strikes, and disputes regarding compliance, the broader ceasefire framework continued to function and widescale fighting across the primary theater did not resume.

November 27, 2024 Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire: Israel and Hezbollah implemented a broadly operative ceasefire framework brokered through international mediators that substantially reduced hostilities across southern Lebanon and northern Israel, including the effective halt of Israel’s major ground offensive into Lebanon and a significant reduction in Hezbollah rocket fire. Although the ceasefire was not formally announced through a single joint declaration by both parties and public statements differed in framing and characterization, a consensus of credible reporting confirmed the arrangement had been mutually agreed and implemented in practice. Despite continued isolated strikes, alleged violations, and disputes regarding compliance, credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefire as remaining operational and widescale fighting across the primary theater of the conflict did not resume.

Examples of non qualifying Ceasefires:

November 24, 2023 Israel–Hamas humanitarian pause: Although it was a mutually agreed and publicly announced broad suspension of hostilities across Gaza, the ceasefire framework remained in effect for only approximately 7 days before wide-scale fighting resumed, failing the required 10-calendar-day duration requirement. Ceasefire violations prior to November 30, would not have invalidated the ceasefire.

July 22, 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative: Although Russia and Ukraine entered into internationally brokered agreements governing grain exports and reducing risks to commercial shipping in the Black Sea, the arrangement did not constitute a general suspension of direct military engagement across the primary theater of the war. Hostilities continued across Ukraine throughout the duration of the agreement and the arrangement applied only to specific categories of activity and geographic areas.

May 2023 Sudan ceasefires (SAF–RSF): Although the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) publicly agreed to multiple internationally brokered ceasefires, a consensus of credible reporting indicated that the general suspension of hostilities across the primary theater never substantively took effect and large-scale fighting broadly continued throughout the ceasefire periods. While some temporary reductions in violence and localized humanitarian access reportedly occurred in certain areas, artillery fire, airstrikes, urban combat, troop movements, and offensive operations continued across major parts of Sudan almost immediately after implementation. Credible reporting broadly treated the ceasefires as having failed or collapsed in practice despite technically remaining in force on paper.

Aunque el consenso humano y el volumen especulativo dan forma al mercado de predicción, nuestros algoritmos cuantitativos ofrecen una contraperspectiva basada en datos. Al analizar señales fundamentales, tendencias subyacentes y distribuciones históricas, nuestro modelo de Valoración por IA calcula una probabilidad de “Valor Justo” independiente para cada resultado.

Comparar este Valor Justo con el Valor de Mercado actual revela grandes discrepancias, conocidas como la Brecha de Valor Esperado (EV). Los contratos con una Brecha de EV positiva representan resultados infravalorados estadísticamente, mientras que una Brecha de EV negativa señala una posible sobrerreacción del mercado.

Principales Oportunidades de Alpha de IA y Arbitraje

Según la última ejecución del modelo de datos, varios contratos clave destacan con desviaciones significativas:

• La mejor jugada de valor (mayor EV): Nuestro modelo identifica a June 30 como la mejor oportunidad de valor del tablero. Mientras el mercado solo le asigna una probabilidad del 3,6%, la evaluación de Valor Justo de nuestra IA se sitúa en 47,2%, generando una notable Brecha de EV de +43,7%.
• Caballos ganadores poco visibles: Otras discrepancias notables incluyen October 31 (Brecha de EV: +30,1%). Estas oportunidades de cola larga están muy infravaloradas por los libros de órdenes pese a un mayor respaldo estadístico de nuestro modelo.