US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…?

Laut den neuesten Prognosemarktdaten zur Frage „US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…?“ haben die Händler einen starken Konsens gebildet.

Derzeit dominiert August 31 den Markt mit einer überwältigenden Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit von 25,5%. August 18 folgt auf dem zweiten Platz mit 22%, während August 13 mit 12,5% auf dem dritten Platz liegt. Das Wettvolumen dieses Marktes hat bereits $2,4M erreicht, was auf großes Interesse hindeutet.

Um besser einzuschätzen, wo jedes mögliche Ergebnis steht, lässt sich der Markt anhand der impliziten Wahrscheinlichkeit und der Kontraktpreise in drei Handelsstufen unterteilen:

🥇 Stufe 1: Der dominante Spitzenreiter

• August 31 (25,5%): Mit der höchsten Wahrscheinlichkeit wird August 31 vom Orderbuch stark favorisiert. Wer auf dieses Ergebnis setzen will, sieht sich einem „Buy Yes“-Kontraktpreis von 26¢ gegenüber – ein Zeichen hoher Marktüberzeugung. Allein dieser Kontrakt hat $1.5M Volumen erzeugt.

🥈 Stufe 2: Die wichtigsten Herausforderer

• August 18 (22%): Als tragfähigste Alternative hält August 18 eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 22%, einzutreten. Seine „Buy Yes“-Anteile werden derzeit zu 22¢ gehandelt.
• August 13 (12,5%): Auf dem dritten Platz mit 12,5% Wahrscheinlichkeit zeigt der Markt eine maßvolle Skepsis gegenüber August 13 und behandelt es als Außenseiter, sofern sich die Dynamik nicht ändert.

🥉 Stufe 3: Die Long-Tail-Optionen (zusammen ~40%)

Über die Top-3 hinaus wird ein breites Feld an Makrovariablen und Außenseiter-Ergebnissen verfolgt. Auch wenn ihre Einzelwahrscheinlichkeiten niedrig sind, bilden sie wichtige Absicherungen für spekulative Händler:

• Alternative Optionen: Dazu gehören July 31 (4,5%) und June 30 (0,3%).
• Spekulatives Volumen: Trotz geringer statistischer Wahrscheinlichkeit ziehen bestimmte Long-Tail-Kontrakte wie July 31 weiterhin nennenswertes Interesse an.

On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics.

This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”

Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures.

If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including:

(i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument;

(ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries;

(iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or

(iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument.

A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must:

(i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting;

(ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify.

The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify:

(i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument;

(ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation;

(iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks.

A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify.

Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies.

An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied.

Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.

Während menschlicher Konsens und spekulatives Volumen den breiteren Prognosemarkt prägen, bieten unsere quantitativen Algorithmen eine datengetriebene Gegenperspektive. Durch Analyse fundamentaler Signale, zugrunde liegender Trends und historischer Verteilungen berechnet unser KI-Bewertungsmodell für jedes Ergebnis eine unabhängige „Fair-Value“-Wahrscheinlichkeit.

Der Vergleich dieses Fair Value mit dem aktuellen Marktwert deckt große Abweichungen auf – die sogenannte Erwartungswert-(EV-)Lücke. Kontrakte mit positiver EV-Lücke sind statistisch unterbewertete Ergebnisse, während eine negative EV-Lücke auf eine mögliche Marktüberreaktion hinweist.

Top-KI-Alpha & fehlbepreiste Arbitrage-Chancen

Auf Basis des jüngsten Datenmodell-Laufs fallen mehrere Schlüsselkontrakte mit deutlichen Abweichungen auf:

• Der beste Value-Play (höchster EV): Unser Modell identifiziert July 31 als die attraktivste Value-Chance auf dem Board. Während der Markt ihm nur eine Handelswahrscheinlichkeit von 4,5% zuweist, liegt die Fair-Value-Einschätzung unserer KI bei 20,7% – eine beeindruckende EV-Lücke von +16,2%.
• Unbeachtete Außenseiter: Weitere bemerkenswerte Abweichungen sind August 18 (EV-Lücke: +10,7%) und June 30 (EV-Lücke: +1,8%). Diese Long-Tail-Chancen werden von den Orderbüchern trotz stärkerer statistischer Untermauerung deutlich abgewertet.